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Oil price indexing is a peculiar feature of the natural gas markets in Germany and other
European countries. It is closely linked to the existence of local monopolies (at least de
facto) and of the so called “take–or–pay” (TOP) contracts. After discussing the relation
between these features and the motivations for oil price indexing, we formally analyze
this strategy in a diﬀerentiated good oligoply with a monopolistic supplier of natural gas
and competing oil distributors. Starting with a symmetric setting, we ﬁrst point out how
oil price indexing works as a collusive device. In a second step we account for the likely
asymmetries between oil and gas distributors. We show that the result obtained under
symmetry is not robust and we discuss how the impact of oil price indexing on prices,
proﬁts and welfare depends on the form and extent of the asymmetries.
Zusammenfassung
Die Ölpreisbindung des Erdgaspreises ist ein hervorstechendes Merkmal des Gasmarktes
in Deutschland und anderen europäischen Ländern. Diese Besonderheit ist eng verknüpft
mit der Existenz lokaler Monopole (trotz Liberalisierung bestehen diese bislang zumin-
dest in Deutschland de facto weiterhin) und sogenannter “take–or–pay” Verträge (TOP
contracts), d. h. ﬁxer Abnahmeverpﬂichtungen zu einem an die Entwicklung des Ölpreises
gekoppelten Abnahmepreises. Nach einer Diskussion der Beziehung zwischen diesen drei
Besonderheiten des Erdgasmarktes und der möglichen Gründe für die Ölpreisbindung
analysieren wir diese Strategie in einem Oligopolmodell mit diﬀerenzierten Produkten mit
einem monopolistischen Erdgasanbieter und einem oder mehreren konkurrierenden Öl-
händlern. Zunächst zeigen wir im Rahmen einer symmetrischen Speziﬁkation auf, wie die
Ölpreisbindung die Kollusion zwischen Erdgas– und Ölanbietern ermöglicht. Anschließend
berücksichtigen wir mögliche Asymmetrien zwischen den beiden Energieformen. Dabei
zeigt sich, dass das Ergebnis bei Symmetrie nicht robust ist und wir diskutieren im Detail
wie die Auswirkung der Ölpreisbindung auf Preise, Gewinne und Wohlfahrt von der Art
und vom Ausmaß der Asymmetrien abhängt.
Keywords: Natural gas market, Oligopoly, oil price indexing, Take–or–pay contracts
JEL–classiﬁcation: D 43, L 41, L 59Oil Price Indexing Of Natural Gas Prices 1
1 Introduction
Due to national implementation of EU regulation and the changing attitude of competition
authorities and regulatory agencies, the institutional settings in the European national
markets for natural gas are changing. Considering the present situation in the German
natural gas market, three peculiar features attract attention: Natural gas is distributed
by local monopolies, there exist long term contracts between importing ﬁrms and the
local distributors as well as between these importing ﬁrms and the foreign gas producing
countries in the form of long–term take–or–pay contracts, and, ﬁnally, the prices on all
stages of the vertical chain are based on some average of oil prices in the past few month
(so called “oil price indexing”). All these features are under scrutiny by competition
authorities. However, it is not clear whether the discussed changes in law and institutional
arrangements will actually result in a more competitive German natural gas market with
lower prices for ﬁnal consumers.
To shed some light on this issue we explore the competitive eﬀects of oil price indexing
in the present institutional setting. As oil and natural gas are close substitutes, at least
for some purposes like heating or generating of electricity, this kind of competition might
in principle yield highly competitive natural gas prices. However, whether this is actually
the case depends on the competitiveness of the global and local oil markets, the actual
degree of substitutability between the two energy sources, natural gas and oil, and, last
but not least, on the eﬀectiveness of oil price indexing as a collusive device. While some of
these aspects must be explored empirically and are thus beyond the scope of the present
analysis, we are going to discuss the interaction of substitutability, competitiveness in the
oil market and the strategy of oil price indexing. This enables us to point out under what
circumstances deviations from the competitive equilibrium are likely to be substantial.
In Germany oil price indexing of the natural gas price was introduced in private long
term contracts between exporters and importers in the late 1960s (Auer 2003). The
natural gas price is usually calculated according to the 6/3/3–rule (BET 2005): The oil
price is observed for six months, then an average oil price is calculated for that time.
After a short time lag of three months, the average price will be enforced for the following
three months.
At the time of introduction, oil price indexing seemed appropriate for a number of
reasons: In long–term contracts, there must be rules about the adjustment of prices. It
seemed reasonable to peg prices to oil, the major competing energy source. As natural
gas only had a very small market share the anti–competitive eﬀect of such a move was
almost negligible. Oil price indexing also insured the investment of local distributors and
ﬁnal consumers against the threat that the few natural gas producing countries would2 Oil Price Indexing Of Natural Gas Prices
abuse their market power once substantial (speciﬁc) investments were made. However,
the situation has changed as natural gas has become the dominant energy source for
new installations in the heating market and also a major competitor in other sectors
of the energy market. Therefore, recently more and more criticism emerged, arguing
that oil price indexing is no longer appropriate (Gassmann 2004). Critics point out that
nowadays the natural gas market has matured and so oil price indexing is only a distortion
of competition. Industry lobbyists counter that liberalization of the natural gas market
would jeopardize the security of supply since only the most “attractive” markets would be
served (E.ON 2004). In 2005, the German Bundeskartellamt (Federal Antitrust Division)
started an investigation on oil price indexing. Some of their arguments against oil price
indexing were summarized in Beuret (2005): (i) The historic reasons are no longer valid,
since more and more applications of oil are substituted through natural gas. (ii) The oil
price is mainly driven by political events and therefore very unstable. (iii) As worldwide
oil stocks are decreasing, oil prices will increase. Higher oil prices will drive up the price
for natural gas although natural gas itself is not short.
As already mentioned, oil price indexing is closely linked to so called take–or–pay
contracts (TOPs). TOPs are long–term supply contracts that last from one up to three
decades and have typically high unconditional payment obligations (Auer 2003). They
are justiﬁed by the long–term balance of risk between the natural gas producers and the
importers. They guarantee the security of supply, and by also specifying the adjustment
of prices they reduce the hold up problem for speciﬁc long term investments. Along this
lines Masten and Crocker (1985) showed that TOPs are an appropriate instrument
to achieve eﬃciency. While critics argue that there has never been a serious conﬂict
between the natural gas importers and exporters — except for the recent dispute between
Russia and Ukraine — there might still be a hold up problem due to the limited number
of potential suppliers. However, note that natural gas prices must not necessarily be
pegged to the oil price and even if oil price indexing prevails in long–term contracts in the
upstream market, this does not necessarily imply that oil price indexing is also appropriate
in local downstream markets.
In this paper we analyze the impact of oil price indexing in local markets in a diﬀerenti-
ated good oligopoly model. We assume that oil and natural gas are imperfect substitutes.
In a fully symmetric setting it is straightforward to show that oil price indexing serves as
a collusive device and reduces welfare. However, this result is not necessarily robust if we
introduce some reasonable asymmetries between oil and natural gas. From a theoretical
point of view we discuss a very speciﬁc strategic commitment — pegging the own price
to the price of a competitor — in an oligopoly model with asymmetries. Speciﬁcally,
we consider diﬀerences in the valuation by consumers and diﬀerences in the degree of2. Motives and Impact 3
substitutability within a speciﬁc form of the diﬀerentiated good (competing oil suppliers)
and between these speciﬁc forms (competition between oil and natural gas suppliers). As
the kind of commitment under consideration is only a second best strategy (compared to
the Stackelberg solution), it is not very surprising that this strategy might no longer be
appropriate in a world with asymmetries. It is, however, our contribution to show which
kind of asymmetries are likely to aﬀect the outcome qualitatively and how prices, proﬁts
and welfare change in the diﬀerent settings.
To discuss the impact of oil price indexing in diﬀerent competitive settings we proceed as
follows: Before analyzing our theoretical model, we discuss the various reasons for oil price
indexing in section 2 in order to give a broader perspective on the issue. The following
section 3 develops the baseline case, a duopoly model with diﬀerentiated products, and
shows how the degree of gas–oil substitutability and preferences of consumers for one
energy source aﬀect the competitive impact of oil price indexing. In section 4 we extend
the analysis by assuming an oligopoly in the local oil market. We are then able to
consider the number of competing oil suppliers and diﬀerences between intra–oil and gas–
oil substitutability as inﬂuencing factors. Finally, section 5 concludes by summarizing
the results obtained in the model and deriving implications for the German natural gas
market.
2 Oil price indexing: Motives and impact
Before we start analyzing the potential eﬀects of oil price indexing in an diﬀerentiated
product oligopoly model, we will highlight aspects of this kind of strategy in a more
broader setting. The main points are (i) oil price indexing as a smart entry strategy, (ii)
the interaction of TOPs in upstream and downstream markets and (iii) insuring consumers
against absolute and/or relative price changes after investment.
In the 1960s coal and oil where the main energy source for heating and electricity
generating in Germany. As natural gas tried to get a larger share of this market, oil price
indexing was a very clever strategy: When deciding about their investment, consumers
are insured against the possibility of hold–up by the natural gas suppliers and against
absolute and relative price changes by pegging the natural gas price to the oil price that
was quite stable at this time. Beyond that, from a game theoretic perspective oil price
indexing was a “puppy dog” strategy, i. e. a promise to refrain from a aggressive pricing
policy as long as the oil ﬁrms would accommodate entry, combined with the threat that
natural gas prices would be adjusted downward when the oil ﬁrms would try to induce
exit by lowering oil prices. At this point of time the strategy was not a problem for4 Oil Price Indexing Of Natural Gas Prices
competition policy authorities as the small scale entry of a new competitor was deﬁnitely
a pro–competitive act. Note, however, that this argument is no longer appropriate at
present when the strategy of oil price indexing is still in place but natural gas has become
a large scale competitor in the energy market.
Another line of reasoning for oil price indexing in the downstream market is based on
the fact that there are long term TOPs upstream that use oil price indexing to address the
hold–up problem in such a long term relationship. To ensure their sales of the provided
natural gas, the national natural gas distributors have similar TOPs with local suppliers.
However, while this aﬀects the costs of these local suppliers it surely does not imply that
they have to ﬁx their pricing policy to oil prices.
A last argument that has been put forth by natural gas suppliers is the insurance of
consumers against price uncertainty. There are two elements of this case for oil price
indexing that should be distinguished: There might be a (partial) insurance against ab-
solute price changes if spot markets for oil are less volatile than the few spot markets for
natural gas (note, however, that oil prices have been quite volatile since the 1970s). The
second element is a insurance against relative price changes — the investment decision of
a consumer will than be optimal ex post if it has been optimal ex ante. Note, however,
that the second point will be already addressed if there is oil price indexing in upstream
markets only as this will aﬀect costs and thus prices of local natural gas distributors
accordingly without unnecessarily introducing a collusive element.
In our formal analysis of oil price indexing we want to concentrate on the strategic
impact of this strategy. We show how it works as a collusive device and discuss how
details of the market structure and asymmetries between oil and natural gas suppliers
aﬀect the results on prices, proﬁts and welfare. To highlight these points it is necessary
to abstract from other aspects: (i) We do not explicitly consider the dynamic structure
of pricing. As explained earlier, in reality the price of natural gas does not depend on
today’s oil price but on an average of past prices. However, due to the fact that the pricing
policy aﬀects medium to long term investment decisions the basic strategic impact would
remain: Oil suppliers would still be able to determine the price of natural gas by their
pricing decision and consumers would foresee that natural gas will follow a lagged but
otherwise identical pricing price path. (ii) In reality consumer switching costs are likely
to be the main reason that natural gas and oil are only imperfect substitutes. However,
a model with switching costs would have been much more complicated to analyze and it
would have been almost impossible to introduce asymmetries in a meaningful way.3. Monopolistic oil supplier 5
3 Baseline case: A monopolistic oil supplier
We do now consider a situation with a single natural gas distributor in a local area. While
this ﬁrm is therefore a monopolist in the local natural gas market, this might not be the
relevant market as there is competition by suppliers of other energy sources: Consumers
are not per se interested in natural gas but look for some kind of primary energy to fulﬁll
their energy needs. Given this broader deﬁnition of the relevant market, the natural
gas distributor competes with suppliers of other forms of energy, namely suppliers of oil.
Oil and natural gas are, however, only imperfect substitutes: Diﬀerent forms of primary
energy are more or less suited to perform the various needs of energy consumption for
transportation, heating or else. There might also be switching costs which are due to
speciﬁc investments in devices that are only usable with a speciﬁc form of primary energy.
For this reason we think that it is appropriate to discuss oil price indexing in an oligopoly
model with diﬀerentiated products. For various assumptions about the degree of compet-
itiveness among oil suppliers and about asymmetries between oil and gas we ask how oil
price indexing aﬀects the market outcome. As a baseline case we consider the competition
between a natural gas distributor and one oil supplier under symmetric product diﬀer-
entiation with zero marginal cost. Because this fully symmetric setting is not likely to
be an appropriate description of reality, we allow for the possibility that consumers may
prefer natural gas over oil or vice versa: For the natural gas supplier the intercept of his
linear inverse–demand schedule is assumed to be α instead of one. Formally we derive the
inverse demand functions by assuming a representative consumer with linear–quadratic
utility











with x1 and x2 indicating the consumption of natural gas and oil, respectively, and x0
representing a numeraire good which is assumed to be produced in another sector of the
economy and has been added linearly to ensure that the marginal utility of income is
equal to one (thus allowing a partial equilibrium welfare analysis).1 The parameter α
is a measure of the preference for one of the two goods: A value of α that exceeds one
indicates that the representative consumer obtains a higher utility by consuming one unit
of natural gas while a value below one means that the consumer prefers oil instead. The
parameter β describes the degree of substitutability between natural gas and oil: If the
products were perfect substitutes β = 1, if they are independent β = 0. In our analysis
1This demand structure is adapted from Dixit (1979). It has been applied elsewhere, for example by
Bester and Petrakis (1993) to analyze cost reducing R&D in a diﬀerentiated good industry or by
Bandulet and Morasch (2003) to analyze incentives to invest in electronic coordination.6 Oil Price Indexing Of Natural Gas Prices
we will ﬁrst normalize the market size parameter α to 1 in order to analyze the impact
of β. In a second step we will then ﬁx β to an intermediate value and check how α 6= 1
might change the results.
Given the utility function in (1), the consumer maximization problem leads to linear
inverse demand functions
p1 (x1,x2) = α − x1 − βx2 (2)
p2 (x1,x2) = 1 − x2 − βx1. (3)
To analyze the duopoly with price strategies we need demand functions that express
quantity demanded as a function of the two prices. Based on the inverse demand functions
(2) and (3) straightforward calculations yield:2
x1, n=1 =
(α − p1) − β (1 − p2)
(1 − β)(1 + β)
(4)
x2, n=1 =
(1 − p2) − β (α − p1)
(1 − β)(1 + β)
. (5)
For p1 > α we get x1, n=1 = 0 and for p2 > 1 we get x2, n=1 = 0. The maximum demand
(α for natural gas and 1 for oil) results if natural gas and oil are independent products
and prices are zero. The higher the degree of substitutability between natural gas and
oil, the higher is the negative eﬀect of lower prices of the competing energy source on own
demand.
Concerning cost we normalize marginal and average costs of both ﬁrms to zero. Fixed
costs are not considered as they do not aﬀect strategic reactions as long as both ﬁrms
remain in the market (as is assumed further on). Assuming zero marginal cost can be
easily justiﬁed in a model with linear demand, as qualitative results would not change if
we assume positive marginal costs. Besides, due to oil price indexing in upstream markets
procurement costs of local oil and natural gas suppliers should be the same and thus it
seems reasonable to assume identical (marginal) costs.
Based on the demand functions and our assumptions about costs we are now able to
compute the equilibria of the simultaneous move game under price competition and the
sequential move game with oil price indexing. The equilibrium under price competition
is derived by simultaneously solving the ﬁrst order conditions of the proﬁt maximization
problems of the natural gas and the oil producer. Under oil price indexing the natural
gas producer is assumed to move ﬁrst by setting his price function p
opi
1 (p2) = p2 (the
superscript opi stands for “oil price indexing”). In the second stage the oil producer
2The subscript n = 1 indicates that we consider the situation with only one oil supplier.3. Monopolistic oil supplier 7
replaces the variable p1 in his proﬁt function by p
opi
1 (p2) and obtains his optimal price by
maximizing the resulting function π2 (p2).




2α − β (1 + αβ)





2 − β (α + β)
(2 − β)(2 + β)
(7)
The highest prices result for β = 0 where the natural gas supplier charges α/2 and the
oil supplier 1/2. For β > 0 the price of natural gas rises as α increases while at the same
time the price of oil declines. Both prices decrease with a rising degree of substitutability
between the two energy sources. For α = 1 and β = 1 both ﬁrms charge a price of zero (the
well known Bertrand paradox), for α > 1 and β close to zero we obtain a corner solution
where the oil supplier stays out of the market (but remains a potential competitor) while
the natural gas supplier chooses the entry blocking price α − 1.3
Under oil price indexing the oil supplier chooses the proﬁt maximizing price under the







Note that for α = 1 ﬁrms will charge the monopoly price 1/2 irrespective of the degree
of product diﬀerentiation — the oil supplier maximizes its proﬁt by setting the monopoly
price because it is assured that the natural gas provider will charge the same price. Oil
price indexing will therefore have no eﬀect for independent products while the collusive
impact will increase as oil and natural gas become better substitutes (see ﬁgure 1). Note
that the high percentage values for price and proﬁt changes stem from the fact that
prices under duopoly competition become quite low for close substitutes. The impact
on welfare is less distinct as distributive eﬀects between consumers and producers cancel
out. Nevertheless, if the symmetric baseline case is an appropriate description of reality,
competition authorities should be quite critical with respect to oil price indexing.
We will now deal with the question whether this result is robust if we introduce asym-
metries. In this section we consider the case where α 6= 1. A ﬁrst interesting result is







2(1 − β)2 (9)
3In the further analysis we restrict attention to interior solutions but we wanted to point out that
asymmetries could yield corner solutions if products are very close substitutes.8 Oil Price Indexing Of Natural Gas Prices
Figure 1: Impact of oil price indexing in the symmetric setting.
Source: Mathematica plot based on own calculations
As can be seen, for all α > 1 the price under oil price indexing negatively depends on β
while it depends positively on β for α < 1 (as already stated above it does not depend on
β for α = 1). This is a ﬁrst indication that oil price indexing may have a positive impact
on welfare if natural gas is valued higher. On the other hand, if natural gas is an inferior
energy source (α < 1), the gas price under oil price indexing will always exceed the price
under duopoly competition (and thus welfare will be reduced).
To take a closer look on the impact of α we do now ﬁx β to an intermediate value
to check how changes in α aﬀect prices, proﬁts and welfare. As can be seen in ﬁgure
2 (for β = 0.5) oil price indexing will not only reduce welfare but also result in lower
proﬁts for the natural gas supplier when the inferiority is suﬃciently pronounced (in our
setting if α ≤ 0.94) — intuitively, the oil supplier chooses a relatively high price because
consumers have a higher willingness to pay and this price exceeds the optimal price for
the natural gas supplier. If, however, natural gas is a suﬃciently superior energy source
(α > 1), oil price indexing might yield a lower natural gas price than under competition
(for α > 1.17). This could be nevertheless in the interest of the natural gas supplier
as the price of oil will be higher under oil price indexing and therefore natural gas will
obtain a higher market share (proﬁts remain positive until α > 1.28). As oil prices are
always higher under oil price indexing, welfare will not rise until α reaches a value of 1.22
— however, there at least remains a small corridor where oil price indexing yields both
higher proﬁts for natural gas suppliers and higher welfare. Intuitively this can happen3. Monopolistic oil supplier 9
because the market share of the natural gas supplier rises and this is both in the interest
of consumers (who value natural gas more highly) and the natural gas supplier. Note
that oil price indexing even yields a Pareto improvement for α between 1.22 and 1.28
as the proﬁt of the oil ﬁrm also rises relative to the competitive solution due to higher
oil prices under oil price indexing.4 Considering the development in the German energy
market since the introduction of oil price indexing in the 1960s, it seems as if natural gas
has become the superior alternative for many purposes (especially heating) and therefore
the case with α > 1 is not unlikely. So we cannot exclude the possibility that oil price
indexing could have unintentionally improved welfare.
Figure 2: Impact of oil price indexing for α 6= 1 and n = 1.
Source: Mathematica plot based on own calculations
In the next section we generalize the analysis by considering an inverse demand system
with n > 1 oil suppliers that allows diﬀerent degrees of substitutability between oil and
4In an asymmetric oligopoly it is welfare improving if a ﬁrm with lower marginal costs (or as in our
interpretation a higher valued product) increases its market share as long as prices and aggregate output
remain constant. Therefore a ﬁrst stage strategy that yields a combination of a higher average price
(that beneﬁts the less “eﬃcient” ﬁrm) and more unequal market shares (that beneﬁt the more “eﬃcient”
ﬁrm and consumers) in the second stage could yield a Pareto improvement. Note that this result
is related to the analysis of Salant and Shaffer, 1999, who observe that aggregate production
costs in a second stage Cournot oligopoly strictly decline (more eﬃciency) with no change in gross
revenue or gross consumer surplus if the ﬁrst stage actions strictly increase the variance of marginal
costs without changing the marginal–cost sum. However, while they show that there is an incentive to
invest in asymmetry, we show how a strategic commitment can exploit an asymmetry to yield a Pareto
improvement relative to the competitive outcome.10 Oil Price Indexing Of Natural Gas Prices
natural gas (β) and among oil suppliers (γ). This will introduce additional possibilities
for welfare improving eﬀects of oil price indexing.
4 Extensions: Oligopolistic oil market
We do now proceed to the general case with n oil suppliers. Here the utility function is
somewhat more complicated,5























As already mentioned α 6= 1 refers to cases where consumers value natural gas more
(α > 1) or less (α < 1) than oil. The interpretation of β remains the same as before.
γ describes the degree of substitutability between two oil distributors. We get perfect
substitutes if γ = 1, however, γ may be smaller than one if ﬁrms supply diﬀerent qualities
of oil or if they may be considered to be diﬀerent by consumers with respect to other
attributes (e. g. location or service).
From (10) we derive (11) and (12),




pj(x1,...,xn+1) = 1 − xj − βx1 − γ
X
i6={1,j}
xi j = 2,...,n + 1. (12)
To highlight the eﬀects of asymmetries, we will now also consider the case with n = 2,
i. e. two competing oil suppliers (raising n further does not aﬀect qualitative results). We
apply the same steps as for n = 1, e. g. rearrange for demand,
x1,n=2 =
(α − p1)(1 + γ) − β
P
i6={1,j} (1 − pi)
1 + γ − 2β2 (13)
xi, n=2 =
(1 − pi) − β (α − p1)(1 − γ) − γ (1 − pj) + β2 (pi − pj)
(1 − γ)(1 + γ − 2β2)
(14)





α[2 − β2 (3 − γ) + γ (1 − γ)] − 2β (1 − β)(1 + β)





2(1 − γ)[γ + (1 − β)(1 + β)] − αβ (1 − γ)(1 + γ)
2[2(1 − β)(1 + β) + γ (1 − γ)]
(16)
5Since it does not aﬀect our later analysis we skipped the numeraire good x0.3. Oligopolistic oil suppliers 11
with i indicating the (identical) prices of the two oil suppliers. Again we compare this
result with the equilibrium under oil price indexing. Note that we must now determine a
non–cooperative equilibrium with the two oil suppliers as active players who both assume
that the price of natural gas will be set equal to the average price of both oil suppliers,




2(1 − αβ)(1 − γ)
4 − β (3 − 2β) + γ (2 − 3β)
. (17)
Comparing (8) with (17) we see that qualitatively the impact of α and β remains the




2(1 − β)(1 − αβ)
4 − β (1 + β)
. (18)
However, there is an additional eﬀect if γ > β: The natural gas price under oil price
indexing will decrease with the substitutability parameter γ — intuitively, oil suppliers
that are closer competitors will set lower prices. It is therefore no longer assured that oil
price indexing is beneﬁcial for the natural gas supplier and even for α ≤ 1 welfare might
be enhanced by oil price indexing.
To visualize the relative strength of the impact of n > 1, α 6= 1 and γ > β we will now
again assume that β = 0.5 and show the result graphically. In the ﬁrst two graphs we
analyze the impact of γ > β for n = 2 and α = 1 and α = 0.9 — the latter situation yields
a reduction of proﬁts and welfare for γ = β. In a next step we analyze the impact of the
rising number of oil suppliers: First we show what changes result for the fully symmetric
setting α = 1 and β = γ. Finally, we check whether the results for α 6= 1 are qualitatively
aﬀected if there are two competing oil suppliers instead of one supplier.
Figure 3 shows for n = 2 and α = 1 the impact of a higher degree of substitutability
between oil producers, γ > β. As the oil ﬁrms compete more intensively, the oil price
under competition is lower than the natural gas price. Given this, oil price indexing,
while still raising the oil price, might yield a lower price for the natural gas supplier. And
if the degree of substitutability between oil producers rises further, even the proﬁts for
the natural gas supplier will be lower under oil price indexing. As in ﬁgure 2 there is
a parameter range where both proﬁts of the natural gas supplier and welfare are higher
under oil price indexing (for values of γ between 0.54 and 0.63).
Figure 4 visualize an interesting interaction between the two diﬀerent forms of asym-
metry: For symmetrically diﬀerentiated products (γ = β) oil price indexing decreases the
proﬁts of the natural gas supplier whenever α is substantially below 1 (a closer inspection
shows that this will be the case for all values of γ if α ≤ 0.94) — see also ﬁgure 2. If,12 Oil Price Indexing Of Natural Gas Prices
Figure 3: Impact of oil price indexing for γ > β and α = 1.
Source: Mathematica plot based on own calculations
Figure 4: Impact of oil price indexing for γ > β and α = 0.9.
Source: Mathematica plot based on own calculations
however, γ > β, oil ﬁrms choose lower prices and therefore oil price indexing may increase
proﬁts of a natural gas supplier although α is substantially below 1 (in the ﬁgure α = 0.9).
For the symmetric setting with α = 1 and β = γ, raising the number of oil suppliers has
only one qualitative impact: While the percentage change of proﬁts under competition
vs. oil price indexing still increases with rising γ, the absolute change in proﬁts has a peak3. Oligopolistic oil suppliers 13
Figure 5: Impact of oil price indexing on proﬁts of natural gas suppliers for various
numbers of competing oil ﬁrms.
Source: Mathematica plot based on own calculations
Figure 6: Impact of oil price indexing for α 6= 1 and n = 2.
Source: Mathematica plot based on own calculations
for medium values of β (see ﬁgure 5). This result stems from the fact that competition
between the oil suppliers is very intense for close substitutes (for β = 1 it does not even
make any diﬀerence whether there are two, three or more competitors — the well known
Bertrand paradox) and therefore the impact of oil price indexing on prices and proﬁts14 Oil Price Indexing Of Natural Gas Prices
becomes quite small in absolute terms (as proﬁts in the competitive setting are even
smaller due to the intense competition this result does not show up when we look at
percentage changes).
Finally let us consider possible eﬀects of a larger number of oil suppliers on the results
for α 6= 1. Figure 6 and ﬁgure 2 are based on the same assumptions, except that n = 2 in
ﬁgure 6. A closer look shows that results do not change qualitatively, but the relatively
low percentage change of welfare (less than 2 % compared to almost 20 % for n = 1)
indicates that competiton authorities should be less concerned about oil price indexing if
there are competing oil suppliers in local markets (as will be mostly the case) that are
not able to coordinate their pricing policies (which might very well be the case).
5 Conclusion
We pointed out that the strategy of oil price indexing can serve as a collusive device
whenever oil and natural gas are imperfect substitutes and the oil market is not perfectly
competitive. That does not mean that oil price indexing will not serve other purposes as
well — e. g. insuring market participants against absolute and/or relative price changes
or enabling a system of long term contract. We only want to stress that this strategy
is not likely to be innocuous in the competitive interaction between oil and natural gas
suppliers.
As has been shown the negative impact on competition will be small as long as oil
markets are highly competitive. However, there exists evidence that collusive behavior
among oil suppliers is not uncommon. Oil price indexing might then have a signiﬁcant
impact on competition and welfare. In a symmetric setting the strategy of oil price index-
ing is always anti–competitive. But it seems to be more realistic to assume asymmetries:
Consumers are likely to assign a higher valuation to one of the two energy sources and oil
from another supplier should be a closer substitute than natural gas. We discussed how
the form and extent of these asymmetries inﬂuences the eﬀects of oil price indexing.
As there exists some empirical evidence that the relative valuation of natural gas has
been increased since the introduction of oil price indexing (the rising market shares of
natural gas are one indication), we cannot rule out the possibility that oil price indexing
might have increased welfare and that prices and proﬁts of the natural gas suppliers under
diﬀerentiated good price competition might have been higher. Nevertheless, even if these
would be actually the case, these are only unintended and more or less accidental results
and therefore we would like to join the critics by stating that this kind of strategy should
be abandoned. Considering the possible advent of competition in local markets for naturalReferences 15
gas, this argument is reinforced by the fact that oil price indexing is likely to facilitate
collusion between competing natural gas suppliers by providing a focal price.
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